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Abstract
We study the idea of information design for inducing prosocial behavior. As an
example, we ground our study in the context of electricity consumption. Electricity
utility providers would like to reduce the total power consumed by their residen-
tial consumer segment. Supply to this segment is often subsidized, and the saved
power can be diverted to more profitable segments. Alternatively, the provider may
be keen on earning carbon credits by inducing reduced consumption in this seg-
ment. The societal network in which the consumers reside may have a prevailing
norm, for example, saving power is environment friendly and is considered good.
Those that consume less are considered more prosocial and may derive a larger
reputational benefit. How can the service provider, who is familiar with the pre-
vailing norm and the consumption of all users, design suitable feedback signals
that exploit reputation benefits to reduce net consumption? We call this a prob-
lem of information design and address this question in this paper. We consider a
continuum of agents. Each agent has a different intrinsic motivation to reduce her
power consumption. Each agent models the power consumption of the others via
a distribution. Using this distribution, agents will anticipate their reputational ben-
efit and choose a power consumption by trading off their own intrinsic motivation
to do a prosocial action, the cost of this prosocial action and their reputation. We
assume that the service provider can provide two types of quantized feedbacks of
the power consumption. We study their advantages and disadvantages. For each
feedback, we characterize the corresponding mean field equilibrium, using a fixed
point equation. Besides computing the mean field equilibrium, we highlight the
need for a systematic study of information design, by showing that revealing less
information to the society can lead to more prosociality. In the last part of the
paper, we introduce the notion of privacy and provide a new quantized feedback,
more flexible than the previous ones, that respects agents’ privacy concern but at
the same time improves prosociality. The results of this study are not restricted to
the framework of energy efficiency but are also applicable to congestion problems
in road traffic and other resource sharing problems.
1 Introduction.
We ground our study of reputation-based information design for inducing prosocial
behavior in the context of electricity consumption. Electricity utility providers are in-
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terested in the reduction of the power consumed by their residential consumer segment.
Supply to this segment is often subsidized and if the electricity utility provider is able
to save power, it will be possible to redirect it to more profitable segments. To do so,
a classical economical approach would be to implement taxes. However, in the resi-
dential consumer segment, these price-based policies can be difficult to implement for
political reasons, they are often unpopular, and for engineering reasons (for instance,
lack of knowledge of demand elasticities for energy-efficient durable goods) .
Recently, considerable attention has been paid to non-price interventions and poli-
cies that nudge consumers to conserve energy. In general, these methods are decentral-
ized ways to change energy consumption behavior, are inexpensive to implement, and
can be applied in any kind of society, whether developed or developing. One example
in the context of demand response is the creation of a lottery with the distribution of
energy coupons [17, 24, 18]. Another example is the use of social comparison and
reputation to improve the prosocial behavior of an agent (which is, in this case, the
reduction of power consumption) [20, 21, 3]. Other experiments have been performed
and are summarized in [4]. The focus of our paper is to derive a game theoretical anal-
ysis of policies that use social comparison as a tool for improving prosocial behavior.
This study is not the first of its kind and we highlight the difference with other related
works in section 6. Social comparison has been proved to be a powerful means to in-
duce prosocial behavior. In the context of the reduction of the total power consumed
by the residential consumer segment, we suggest using social comparison instead of
monetary reward because reduced consumption can be portrayed as a prosocial action.
There is then a reputation benefit that can be attached to the reduction effort. Contrary
to what one might expect at first glance, monetary rewards may reduce the expected
prosocial action in some setting, as it has been demonstrated in [6].
Our game theoretical model and analysis can be described as follows. The inten-
sity of a person’s prosocial orientation will be determined by three factors: her intrinsic
interest in doing a prosocial action, the cost associated with this action and finally the
desire to be perceived as generous and altruistic. The last factor can be seen as the
agent’s desire to have a good reputation in the society. By society we mean a group
of people upon whom the agents want to make a good impression. From this perspec-
tive, the society can be even the individual herself, when the individual is viewing and
assessing his own action, in which case we talk about self-signaling and identity. As
observed in [6], from a modeling perspective, there is no major difference between the
society being a set of individuals or the agent herself.
The society assesses an individual’s reputation based on its collective estimate of
the agent’s prosociality. This estimation is done using the knowledge of the actions of
the different agents. This knowledge of actions can be total or partial. For example, in
the context of household energy consumption, we can imagine two types of observation
of the consumption of different households.
• In the first scenario, the electricity utility provider may publicize a full report
to the society on the consumption of each agent1. The society is then able to
estimate precisely how much more altruistic is one person’s action than another
person’s action (thus ordering each person according to her respective altruism
level).
1While this might seem an overkill in the electricity consumption context, such things are possible in the
context of donations, voluntarism, committee work that help run an institution, etc. Our study should be seen
in this broader context.
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• In the second scenario, perhaps to address privacy concerns, the report may only
show that the consumption of an agent is larger or smaller than a threshold.
Others in the society, then, are only able to say if a person belongs to the more
generous group or to the less generous one.
These two examples have the merit of demonstrating that it is possible, by manip-
ulating the amount of information observed by members of the society, to mobilize
societal opinion concerning an agent. We also notice that the second scenario respects
agents’ privacy concerns to a greater extent than the first one. Indeed, in the first
scenario the action of each agent is fully reported to the society (there is a complete
disclosure of the level of action). On the contrary, in the second scenario, the society
gets to know only whether an agent belongs to the more generous group or to the less
generous one.
Our goal is to show the importance of information design to improve prosocial
behavior. The initial model is inspired from [6] which we extend in this paper to more
complex information designs. We compare the impact of the different parameters on
the efficiency and highlight the impact of the different information designs on prosocial
behavior. From a mathematical point of view, extensions of the model [6] requires new
proofs of existence, uniqueness under some conditions, and characterization of the
mean field equilibria which we provide in this paper. Additionally, we discuss several
possible extensions and future directions which we feel will be of use to researchers in
the field.
1.1 Organization and Main Results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the game the-
oretical model. We describe the main components of the societal network which in our
example is the complete (fully connected) network of all the agents, the agents’ intrin-
sic motivations, their actions, the cost function associated with performing an action,
and finally the reputational benefit associated to a given action. In this section, we also
explain how the computation of reputation benefit can be understood as a signal extrac-
tion problem. We also introduce the different feedbacks of an agent’s action. Section
3 is the main section of this paper. We prove the existence and study the properties
of mean field equilibria for the two feedback mechanisms. We are able to prove the
existence of a mean field equilibrium and characterize it using a fixed point equation.
For the second feedback, sufficient conditions for some uniqueness properties of the
equilibrium follow naturally. We also compute explicitly the set of mean field equilib-
ria for the feedbacks considered, under the assumption that the intrinsic values follows
the uniform distribution. In section 4, we will show how important the choice of feed-
back and the choice of the partition (into less prosocial and more prosocial groups) can
be in improving the expected prosocial action. In section 5, we formalize a notion of
privacy, and then introduce a new feedback that improves privacy at the expense of the
aggregate level of prosociality. In section 6, we discuss the related works and highlight
the major difference of our work with the unified framework suggested in [8, 9] and
with the norm based approach described in [6, 7, 2]. In section 7, we discuss many
possible extensions of this work and future directions. Finally, section 8 concludes the
paper with a very brief summary of our work.
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Table 1: Main notations used throughout this paper
Symbol Meaning
I := [0, 1] Agent set. i ∈ I is the index of a given agent.
A := [0,+∞) Action space. ai ∈ A is the action of agent i.
wi ∈ R+ Intrinsic value. The empirical cdf of (wi)i∈I is F .
L(ai) Quantized version of agent i’s action provided by the service
provider to the societal network.
C(·) Cost function such that C : [0,+∞)→ R+.
Table 2: Different L functions with the associated utilities
Feedback L(ai) Agents’ objectives
Type-A ai max
ai∈[0,+∞)
{aiwi − C(ai) + βE [wi | ai]}
Type-B 1ai≥θ
max
{
max
ai∈[0,θ]
aiwi − C(ai) + βE [wi | ai < θ] ,
max
ai∈[θ,+∞)
aiwi − C(ai) + βE [wi | ai ≥ θ]
}
2 Model.
We assume that the societal network consists of a continuum number of agents, as we
shall make precise soon. Each agent chooses an action from a set which is taken to be
totally ordered in terms of prosocial behavior. An agent’s choice of an action is based
on three components, the agent’s intrinsic motivation (for instance the prosocial orien-
tation of the agent), a cost associated with her action and a reputational benefit. The
reputational benefit captures the effect of judgments and reactions of other members of
the society towards an agent. A social service provider (e.g. utility service provider or
government) is interested in the maximization of the global level of prosocial actions.
For each agent, the service provider can manipulate an agent’s reputational benefit
by designing the information other agents get about this agent’s choice. We assume
that the agent’s intrinsic motivation is private information known only to herself but
the distribution of agents’ intrinsic motivation is common knowledge. Agents inter-
act with each other through the information fed by the social service provider and the
consequent reputational benefits they derive. Moreover, since the number of agents is
infinite, the global level of prosocial actions in the societal network is the outcome of a
mean field equilibrium. The service provider’s problem is thus an Information Design
Problem.
The three main components of the societal network are the following. i) Agents and
actions: What is the set of agents, what are the agents’ action spaces, and how do others
in the society interpret agents’ actions? ii) Intrinsic value and cost function: What is
the information known about the agents’ intrinsic values and the cost functions? iii)
Reputational benefit: How is reputational benefit quantified? In the rest of this section,
we develop a model of the societal network and address each of these questions. The
main symbols used in this paper are summarized in Table 1.
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Agents and actions: The agent set is the continuum I := [0, 1]. Let i ∈ I be
a given agent. We suppose that each agent has a continuum of possible actions. We
denote the action space as A := [0,+∞). The action of agent i is denoted by ai ∈ A.
For all (ai, a′i) ∈ A2, if ai > a′i then agent i performs a greater prosocial action when
she chooses ai over a′i. For instance if ai captures the energy savings of agent i, then
the savings of energy is greater under the greater prosocial action ai than under the
lesser prosocial action a′i.
Intrinsic value and cost function: Each agent i is endowed with an intrinsic value
wi and gets a reward of value aiwi for an action ai. Larger the wi, greater the propen-
sity of the agent towards a more prosocial action. The cumulative distribution func-
tion (cdf) of wi is F . For each agent i, performing the action ai costs C(ai), where
C : [0,+∞)→ R+ is a convex and increasing function. F and C are common knowl-
edge to all the agents and the service provider.
Reputational benefit: The reputational benefit is described by the following steps.
1. For each i ∈ I, the intrinsic motivation of agent i is given by her prosocial
propensity wi. When the agent i chooses an action ai, she reveals some infor-
mation about wi to the service provider.
2. Given ai, which is agent i’s action, the service provider reveals a quantized ver-
sion of ai, denoted by L(ai), to all agents in the societal network. The function
L is common knowledge. Our goal is to understand the consequence of various
choices of L by the service provider. Since L controls the amount of informa-
tion about agent i’s action ai, this is an information design problem. A simple
example is the privacy friendly feedback scheme L(ai) = 1ai≥θ, with θ ∈ R+.
3. When an action ai is taken and L(ai) is revealed to all, as discussed above, some
information about the agent’s private wi is also revealed to the societal network
yielding a reputational benefit βE [wi | {L(ak)}k∈I ], with β ∈ R+. The notion
that the reputation of an agent is based on the societal network’s opinion about
her intrinsic value wi, arising from the information that her action ai reveals, has
already been used in [10, 6, 7].
The above is a model in the context of consumption of energy in a psychological
experiment in [20], which we now describe. It encompasses the following steps.
Step 1: For a given day the service provider measures the consumption of energy
of each household in a neighborhood.
Step 2: If the consumption of a given household is below θ, the service provider
puts a green flag in front of that house; otherwise, nothing is done.
Step 3: Each household observes the flag in front of every other house and estimates
the intrinsic motivation of that other household.
For each i ∈ I, we assume that the utility of agent i for action ai is the sum of the
rewards arising from her propensity for prosocial behavior, the cost function and the
reputational benefit. Agent i is thus interested in maximizing:
max
ai∈[0,+∞)
U(ai, wi; a−i, w−i) := aiwi − C(ai) + βE [wi | {L(ak)}k∈I ] , (1)
with a−i (resp. w−i) being the actions (resp. the intrinsic motivations) of all the
agents except agent i.
Let G be the cdf of actions ai, i ∈ I. This results in a certain feedback profile
{L(ak)}k∈I . The best response of agent i to {L(ak), k ∈ I}, which is a function of
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G, is given by:
a∗i (wi;G) = arg max
ai∈[0,+∞)
U(ai, wi; a−i, w−i). (2)
We will assume that a∗i (wi;G) is uniquely defined. See examples later. For a given G,
let TG be the distribution of the induced best response actions. A mean field equilib-
rium is defined as follows.
Definition 1. The distribution G∗ is a mean field equilibrium if TG∗ = G∗.
We refer the technical reader to a mathematically rigorous reformulation in the
Appendix 9. The equilibrium G∗ will naturally depend on the feedback signal L.
One objective of the service provider could be to optimize the aggregate prosocial
action:
W := max
L(·)
∫
A
b dG∗(b). (3)
Let Wj be the expected prosocial action when type-j feedback is provided, with j ∈
{A,B}. Type-A feedback reveals the action of an agent to the whole society. This
feedback does not preserve the privacy of an agent’s action. Under type-B feedback,
the society only knows whether an agent belongs to the more prosocial group or to the
less prosocial one. Therefore this provides better privacy than type-A feedback. See
Table 2 for a summary the two feedbacks and the utilities.
We now make the following assumptions about the cost function and the feedback
functions for illustration of our main ideas.
Assumption A:
1. The cost function C(a) = 12αa
2.
2. L(·) is one of the functions defined in Table 2. In type-B, the service provider
can additionally control one threshold parameter, denoted θ.
We shall discuss extensions to general convex costs in section 7 and additional feed-
backs in section 5.
3 Equilibria for type-A and type-B feedback schemes.
In this section, we characterize and study the properties of mean field equilibria for rep-
utational benefit feedback types A and B. For ease of notation, we write E [wi | Lj(·)]
for E [wi | {Lj(ak)}k∈I ], when the feedback is type-j, j ∈ {A, B}. We will also write
E [wi | Lj(·), Lj(ai)] to draw the reader’s attention to the feedback L(ai).
3.1 Type-A equilibrium.
We begin with a characterization of type-A equilibrium which is also portrayed in
figure 1(a).
Theorem 2. Under assumption A, there is a unique mean field equilibrium for type-
A feedback. The prosocial action of player i is the unique solution to the following
equation:
ai =
wi
α
+ β(1− e− aiβ ). (4)
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a1
TG(a)
Equilibrium with no feedback
Upper bound
Type- A equilibrium
β
(a) Distribution of a∗(wi;G) under the type-A feedback.
wi
a(wi)
wi
α
wi
α
+ β
(b) a∗(wi;G) under the type-A
feedback.
Figure 1: Distribution and shape of a∗(wi;G) under the type-A feedback.
Moreover,
E[wi | LA(·)] = wi (5)
∂E[wi | LA(·)]
∂ai
=
β
α
(1− e− aiβ ). (6)
Remark: Theorem 2 states that type-A feedback will result in an equilibrium that
not only reveals ai to the whole society but also reveals the intrinsic value wi (since
we will have E[wi | LA(·)] = wi). In this case, the societal network learns everything
about every agent. Also observe that feedback has pushed the agents towards more
prosocial actions. In fact,wi/α ≤ ai ≤ wi/α+β. In the limiting case limwi→+∞ ai =
wi
α + β and limwi→0+ ai =
wi
α . See figure 1(b).
Remark: An examination of the proof below will indicate that it is nontrivial and
nonstandard because it involves a functional fixed point equation. A similar exercise is
carried out in Bénabou and Tirole for the two-dimensional Gaussian case [6].
Proof. We now provide the proof of Theorem 2. Since we will consider unilateral
deviations, let us view E[wi | LA(·)] as a function of ai, while keeping all other actions
fixed. Consider an agent with a specific wi. For her not to deviate, we must ensure the
first order optimality condition which is
wi = αai − β ∂E[wi | LA(·)]
∂ai
. (7)
Since G∗ is an equilibrium action profile, (7) must hold for all i ∈ I. Let us search for
those strategies that make the right-hand side of (7) monotone increasing in ai. By this
assumption, whose validity we shall later check for our final solution, revealing ai is as
good as revealing wi to all agents. This implies that at equilibrium E[wi | LA(·)] = wi
for every player i ∈ I (i.e., every wi). Plugging this into (7), we have the following:
E[wi | LA(·)] = αai − β ∂E[wi | LA(·)]
∂ai
. (8)
Let us define x(ai) = E[wi | LA(·)]. By taking the derivative in ai in the previous
equation, we obtain:
x¨(ai) =
1
β
(α− x˙(ai)). (9)
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The solution to this linear differential equation is given by:
x˙(ai) = ζe
− aiβ + α. (10)
For agent i with wi = 0, we must have ai = 0. Indeed as stated previously the
reputation of this agent is equal to 0. So any nonzero action only adds to cost, and
therefore 0 is the best response. This boundary condition, using (7) and (10), yields
ζ = −α. By rearranging (7), we have:
ai =
wi
α
+ β(1− e− aiβ ). (11)
It is easy to see there is a unique solution ai to (11) (intersection of a linear function and
a concave increasing function that starts at a strictly positive value wi/α but saturates
at wi/α + β, see Figure 2). Finally, we check that the monotonicity assumption holds
for the obtained ai. From (10), we have αai − βx˙(ai) = α[ai − β(1 − e−
ai
β )]. Its
derivative is α(1− e− aiβ ) ≥ 0. This concludes the proof.
wi
α
+ β
wi
α
1 ai
Figure 2: Intersection between ai and wiα + β(1− e−
ai
β ).
Moreover we can observe that because wiα − ai + β(1− e−
ai
β ) is decreasing in ai
which satisfied the initial concavity assumption stated at the beginning of the proof.
Remark: It is clear from the proof that uniqueness crucially hinges on the boundary
condition ai = 0 when wi = 0.
3.2 Type-B equilibrium.
As described in the previous section, agent i computes her prosocial action given her
intrinsic motivation wi and her cost function C(·). We state in this subsection, a fixed
point equation that characterizes the best response ai to an action profile G for each wi
under the assumption that L(·) is of type-B. Following this, we will demonstrate the
existence of mean field equilibria.
For the type-B feedback function LB(·), and with G being the cdf of actions, agent
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i’s best response a∗i (wi;G) is determined via:
UB(a
∗
i (wi;G), wi) :=
max
a∗i1(wi;G)wi − α
(a∗i1(wi;G))
2
2
+ βE [wi | LB(·), a∗i1 < θ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
U1B(a∗i1,wi)
,
a∗i2(wi;G)wi − α
(a∗i2(wi;G))
2
2
+ βE [wi | LB(·), a∗i2 ≥ θ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2B(a∗i2,wi)
 ,
(12)
where (if the maxima below exist):
a∗i1(wi;G) := arg maxai∈[0,θ)U1B(ai, wi), (13)
a∗i2(wi;G) := arg maxai∈[θ,+∞)U2B(ai, wi), (14)
a∗i (wi;G) :=
{
a∗i1(wi;G) if U1B(a
∗
i1(wi;G), wi) > U2B(a
∗
i2(wi;G), wi),
a∗i2(wi;G) otherwise.
Here, under assumptions of existence, the candidate action level a∗i1(wi;G) cor-
responds to the optimal action of agent i if she were to perform an action below the
threshold θ. On the contrary, if agent i were to perform an action θ or above , then the
optimal choice would be a∗i2(wi;G). The final choice a
∗
i (wi;G) is the better of the two
and thus the global optimum. In order to study the equilibria of this game, the first step
is to derive an expression of a∗i1(wi;G), a
∗
i2(wi;G) and a
∗(wi;G) as a function of wi
by assuming that the reputational benefits are given. Then the second step will be to
derive a closed form expression of reputational benefits.
Let c1 := E[wi | LB(·), ai < θ] and c2 := E[wi | LB(·), ai ≥ θ]. Clearly c1 is a
function of LB(·) and 1ai<θ and hence is a constant for all ai < θ. Similarly c2 is a
constant for all ai ≥ θ.
Proposition 3. (Best response to G) Under assumption A, if ∆B(G) := c2 − c1 is
positive, then agent i’s best response to G is
a∗i (wi;G) :=
{
wi/α if wi ∈ [0, u) ∪ [αθ,+∞)
θ if u ≥ wi < αθ, (15)
with u ∈ [0, αθ] satisfying:
u =
[
αθ −
√
2αβ∆B(G)
]
+
. (16)
Proof. From measurability considerations, we have
c1 := E[wi | LB(·), ai < θ] is independent of ai,
c2 := E[wi | LB(·), ai ≥ θ] is independent of ai.
Case 1: Consider an individual with wi < αθ. Her nonreputational utility function is
depicted in Figure 3. Since c2 is a constant independent of ai when ai ≥ θ, it is optimal
for the agent not to play any ai other than θ in the set [θ,+∞). Now let us consider
ai < θ versus ai = θ. When ai < θ, it is optimal for her to play ai = wi/α, and she
derives the utility:
UB(a
∗
i1(wi;G), wi) =
w2i
2α
+ βc1. (17)
9
aiwi
α
θ
aiwi − a
2
i
2
Figure 3: Case 1: θ > wiα
When ai = θ, she derives the utility:
UB(θ, wi) = θwi − αθ
2
2
+ βc2. (18)
Clearly then, those individuals with wi ∈ [0, αθ] such that
θwi − αθ
2
2
+ βc2 ≥ w
2
i
2α
+ βc1 ⇔ w
2
i
2α
− θwi + αθ
2
2
≤ β(c2 − c1)
⇔ (wi − αθ)
2
2α
≤ β(c2 − c1)
⇔ | wi − αθ |≤
√
2αβ(c2 − c1)
⇔ −
√
2αβ(c2 − c1) ≤ wi − αθ
≤
√
2αβ(c2 − c1),
will play θ. Since we are considering wi < αθ, agents with wi ∈ [u, αθ] where:
u =
[
θα−
√
2αβc2 − c1
]
+
(19)
will play θ. Others with wi < u will play ai = wi/α. Hence,
a∗(wi;G) :=
{ wi
α
, if wi ∈ [0, u),
θ, if wi ∈ [u, αθ).
(20)
Case 2: Consider now an individual withwi ≥ αθ. Her nonreputational utility function
is depicted in Figure 4. Since c1 is a constant independent of ai for ai < θ, and since
c2 > c1, it is optimal for her not to play any ai smaller than θ. It is also clear that if
ai ≥ θ, she should pick ai = wiα . Hence a∗(wi;G) = wi/α for all i with wi ≥ αθ.
Finally, summarizing both cases, we get:
a∗(wi;G) :=
{
θ, if wi ∈ [u, αθ),
wi
α
, otherwise, (21)
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aiwi − αa
2
i
2
aiwi
α
θ
Figure 4: Case 2: θ ≤ wiα
with u as in (19). This proves Proposition 3.
The next corollary provides the distribution of the best response profile a∗(wi;G),
and can be easily deduced from the previous Proposition 3.
Corollary 4. Let G be an action profile. Under assumptions A and ∆B(G) ≥ 0, the
best response profile TG is:
TG(a) :=
 F (αa) if a ∈ [0, u/α),F (u) if a ∈ [u/α, θ),
F (αa) if a ∈ [θ,+∞),
(22)
where u is given in (16) and depends on G through ∆B(G).
au
α
F (u)
F (αθ)
1
TG(a)
θ
Figure 5: Distribution of a∗(wi;G) under the type-B feedback. A segment of the
population increase their prosocial action level to θ.
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The distribution of the best response of the agents is depicted in Figure 5. The shape
TG has the following properties. Firstly we note that if wi > αθ, the prosocial action
of agent i is equal to wiα which is the same as in the case when the reputation benefit is
not part of her utility (β = 0). Also we can notice that by playing wiα , she will reveal
to the service provider her intrinsic motivation, since the service provider knows α. In
the case of wi < αθ, two situations can occur. If wi < u, then again the best response
of agent i will be to choose wiα and the same conclusion can be applied. On the other
hand, if wi ∈ [u, αθ), then agent i chooses a∗i (wi;G) = θ which implies that now her
reputation is equal to E[wi | LB(·), ai ≥ θ]. From this observation, we can deduce
that, first, the agent makes the bare minimum effort to go into the next reputation
category and, second, the agent does not fully reveal wi to the service provider 2.
This pattern of jump in prosocial actions for a segment of the population has been
also observed in donations [23], when there are categories of donations. Indeed, the
amount of donations are not distributed according to the uniform distribution but rather
according to a multimodal distribution where each mode corresponds to the minimum
amount of donation needed to enter into a corresponding category. All others have
either (1) sufficiently high intrinsic motivation (wi > αθ) that playing lower without
losing the reputational benefit only results in lower intrinsic benefit and so lower utility,
or (2) sufficiently low intrinsic motivation (wi < u) that playing higher will result in
higher cost.
We assume that F has a density f(·) and a finite expectation E[wi]. Define Tc1 and
Tc2 as the c1 and c2 associated with TG (See paragraph before Proposition 3). These
are then:
Tc1 :=
∫ u
0
wf(w) dw
F (u)
= u−
∫ u
0
F (w) dw
F (u)
. (23)
Tc2 :=

∫ +∞
u
wf(w) dw
1− F (u) = u+
∫ +∞
u
[1− F (w)] dw
1− F (u) , if F (u) < 1,
u if F (u) = 1,
(24)
where (24) holds because the distribution F is assumed to have finite mean. Thus,
∆B(TG) = Tc2−Tc1 =

∫ +∞
u
[1− F (w)] dw
1− F (u) +
∫ u
0
F (w) dw
F (u)
, if F (u) < 1
u− E[wi], if F (u) = 1.
(25)
At equilibrium, TG∗ = G∗ and hence ∆B(TG∗) = ∆B(G∗). Since ∆B(TG) de-
pends on only F (known, fixed) and u (to be determined), let us write:
XB(u) :=

∫ +∞
u
[1− F (w)] dw
1− F (u) +
∫ u
0
F (w) dw
F (u)
, if F (u) < 1,
u− E[w], if F (u) = 1.
(26)
Taking the derivative with respect to u and simplifying, we get
X ′B(u) =
 f(u)
[∫ +∞
u
[1− F (w)] dw
(1− F (u))2 −
∫ u
0
F (w) dw
F (u)2
]
if F (u) < 1,
1, if F (u) = 1.
(27)
2Note that the service provider knows the actions, and from ai = θ can infer thatwi ∈ [ uα , θ). However,
the other agents only get to see 1ai≥θ . The increased reputation benefit stems from this economical feedback
to the other agents.
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Figure 6: Unique equilibrium for type-B feedback
From (26) and (27), we can conclude that limu↓0XB(u) = E[w], that XB(u) ≥ u −
E[w] − δ for a δ > 0 and all u sufficiently large and hence limu↑+∞XB(u) = +∞.
Furthermore, we can also conclude that XB(u) is differentiable for all u with F (u) <
1, and further XB(u) continuous for all 0 ≤ u < +∞. From the relation in (16) and
the condition ∆B(TG∗) = ∆B(G∗), we see that the intersection (or lack thereof) of
the curves XB(u) in (26) and (u− αθ)2/(2α) will determine the equilibria.
Two cases can occur. The first case is when there is no intersection between
βXB(u) and (u−αθ)2/(2α). In this case, βXB(u) is always greater, and from an equi-
librium perspective, u = 0 in (16), and all agents such that wi < αθ will play θ. The
rest of the agents will play wiα . The second case is when βXB(u) and (u−αθ)2/(2α)
intersect for some u < αθ, as in Figure 6. Clearly, if F has a nontrivial density, then
XB(αθ) > 0. (If F (αθ) = 1, then E[w] < αθ since F has a nontrivial density and
XB(αθ) > 0 from the second case in (26). If F (αθ) < 1, then first formula in (26)
applies and XB(αθ) ≥
(∫ αθ
0
F (w) dw
)
/F (αθ) > 0.) A sufficient condition for an
interior uMFE is then θ >
√
2βE[w]/α. We have thus established:
Theorem 5. A mean field equilibrium always exists. Moreover, the following hold:
1. If βXB(u) and (u− αθ)2/(2α) intersect at uMFE ∈ [0, αθ), then a mean field
equilibrium exists with a∗i (wi) as given in (15) and u
MFE solution of (16).
2. If βXB(u) is greater than (u − αθ)2/(2α) for all u ∈ [0, αθ], then all agents
such that wi < αθ will play θ and the rest of the agents will play wiα .
3. If θ >
√
2βE[w]
α , there is at least one intersection for the curves βXB(u) and
(u−αθ)2
2α .
Uniqueness of the mean field equilibrium can be ensured if βXB(u) and u
2
2α−θu+
α θ
2
2 have a unique intersection. This is the case if βXB(u) is increasing in u.
4 Shaping of feedback.
We now consider two examples to highlight the need for a systematic study of infor-
mation design.
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4.1 Being economical with the truth can improve the net prosocial
action.
In type-A feedback the service provider revealed all the actions. In type-B feedback,
the service provider revealed only the categories (more prosocial or less prosocial) to
which an individual belonged. Let WA and WB denote the net prosocial actions of
the population under type-A feedback and type-B feedback respectively. In the next
proposition, we will give conditions such that WB is greater than WA.
Proposition 6. If f(w) is decreasing in w ∈ [0,+∞) and if there exist θ, α and β such
that the following conditions are satisfied:∫ αθ
0
(
θ − w
α
)
f(w) dw > β, (28)
βE[w] >
αθ2
2
, (29)
then WB > WA.
Proof. If f(w) is decreasing then XB(u) is increasing for u ∈ (0, αθ) (see [15]).
If βE[w] = limu→0 βXB(u) > αθ
2
2 , then u is always is equal to 0 according to
Proposition 3. Observe from Theorem 5 that WA ≤ E[w]α + β. Hence,
WB −WA ≥ WB − E[w]
α
− β
≥
∫ u
0
w
α
f(w) dw + θ
∫ αθ
u
f(w) dw +
∫ +∞
αθ
w
α
f(w) dw − E[w]
α
− β
= θ
∫ αθ
u
f(w) dw −
∫ αθ
u
w
α
f(w) dw − β > 0.
where the last equality follows from (28). This concludes the proof.
We now provide an example where the conditions of Proposition 6 are satisfied. In
Figure 7(a), we first understand why these two conditions are in opposition. Indeed,
if we want (28) to be satisfied we will need a small β so that the area of the crossed
region is at least β. But if β is too small we will reduce the area of the square dotted
region which will affect (29). Similar conclusions can be drawn for θ. By increasing θ,
it will be easier to satisfy (28), but more difficult to satisfy (29).
Let us consider that the density f(w) = kλ (
w
λ )
k−1e−(
w
λ )
k
(Weibull distribution)
with a scale parameter (λ) equal to 1 and shape parameter (k) equal to 0.5. When the
shape parameter is lower than 1, f(w) is decreasing in w. Take α = 1. The results of a
numerical simulation in Figure 7(b), indicate that the pairs (β, θ) in the darkened area
satisfy the conditions of Proposition 6. For these parameters, being economical with
the feedback improves the net prosocial action.
4.2 The uniform distribution case and an explicit optimization.
In this subsection, we study the example when F has the uniform distribution over
[0, 1]. Under this assumption, an agent’s intrinsic motivation is her rank in the society,
i.e., F (wi) = wi = i. The utility of agent i can be rewritten as follows:
U(ai, i, a−i) = aii− C(ai) + βE[i | {L(ak)}k∈I ]. (30)
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wf(w)
θf(w)
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β
∫ +∞
0
wf(w)dw
θ
∫ θ
0
f(w)dw
> β
> θ
2
2
θ
(a) Graphical illustration of (28) and (29) when α =
1.
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(b) Parameters β and θ such that the con-
ditions of Proposition 6 are satisfied for a
Weibull distribution.
Figure 7: Situations when WB > WA.
For simplicity, assume αβ < 1. Since we will be interested in making individuals
jump to more prosocial actions, from Figure 5, we have that αθ ≤ 1.
It can be easily checked that XB(u) ≡ 0.5. The mean field is determined by the
intersection between a constant function βXB(u) ≡ β0.5 and the decreasing polyno-
mial function (u − αθ)2/(2α) in the interval u ∈ [0, αθ]. If there is no intersection
then uMFE = 0. Thus uMFE = [θα−√αβ]+. Furthermore, by Theorem 5:
a∗(i) :=
{
i/α if i ∈ [0, [αθ −√αβ]+) ∪ [αθ, 1]
θ otherwise. (31)
The net prosocial action under type-B feedback is given by:
WB =
1
2α
[w2]
[αθ−√αβ]+
0 + θ(αθ − [αθ −
√
αβ]+) +
1
2α
[w2]1αθ
=

1
2α
+
αθ2
2
if θ ≤√β/α
αβ + 1
2α
if θ >
√
β/α
(32)
=
1
2α
+
1
2
min
{
αθ2, β
}
. (33)
Note that if θ ≤ √β/α, then WB is increasing in θ else WB is independent of θ.
Therefore the optimal θ to use will be any θ that satisfies 1α ≥ θ ≥
√
β
α .
15
5 A new feedback for trading off privacy for efficiency.
Our initial intuition was that type-A feedback will maximize the level of aggregate
prosocial action. Surprisingly, as highlighted in Figure 7(b) for the Weibull distribution,
this is not always the case. Additionally, type-A feedback may not satisfy the privacy
concerns of agents. In this section, we will first define a privacy measure associated
with a feedback. We then extend type-B feedback by allowing multiple thresholds.
Finally, we propose an optimal information design problem.
5.1 A privacy measure.
Our measure of privacy is the extent to which the society is uncertain about an agent’s
intrinsic motivation, averaged across the population. Recall that the society observes
L(a∗i (wi)), therefore E[wi | L(·)] is the minimum mean squared error estimate of wi.
We define the privacy measure as the mean square error over the population:
V (L) =
∫ +∞
0
(wi − E[wi | L(·)])2f(wi) dwi. (34)
When V (L) = 0, the society is able to infer precisely the true value of wi for each
agent i. The higher V (L) the greater is our measure of privacy.
5.2 Type-Bm feedback (multi-threshold type-B feedback).
We explore the following feedback:
LBm(x) = n− 1 if x ∈ [θn−1, θn), (35)
with 0 = θ0 < θ1 < · · · < θN = +∞. Let us consider the following candidate
equilibrium, where the strategy of agent i, if wi ∈ [vn−1, vn), is given by:
arg max
ai∈[θn−1,θn)
{aiwi − C(ai) + βE[wi | LBm(·), ai ∈ [θn−1, θn)]} , (36)
with 0 = v0 < v1 < · · · < vmax, where vmax is the smallest v with F (v) = 1. Only
a quantized signal of agent i’s action is revealed, whose wi ∈ [vn−1, vn), is revealed,
and therefore her reputational benefit comes from
Y (vn, vn−1) := E[wi | LBm(·), ai ∈ [θn−1, θn)]
= E[wi | wi ∈ [vn−1, vn)] =
∫ vn
vn−1
wf(w) dw
F (vn)− F (vn−1) .
Note that Y (vn+1, vn) ≥ Y (vn, vn−1) for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}.
An agent i, with wi ∈ [vn−1, vn), who is evaluating a deviation from the candidate
equilibrium, will face the following optimization problem:
max
n∈{1,...,N}
{[wi
α
]θn
θn−1
wi − α
2
([wi
2α
]θn
θn−1
)2
+ βY (vn, vn−1)
}
, (37)
with [x]ba = min{max{x, a}, b}. This is obtained by first solving the optimization
problem (36) within the interval ai ∈ [θn−1, θn), the solution to which is
[wi
α
]θn
θn−1
,
followed by an optimization over n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
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(v1 − αθ1)2
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v1 = 1− (v2 − αθ2)
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Figure 8: Fixed point equations for Type-Bm feedback, under the condition that v1 ∈
(0, αθ1) and v2 ∈ (αθ1, αθ2).
If we assume that for all n′ ≥ n∗ which may depend on i,
θn′
(
wi − αθn
′
2
)
+ βY (vn′+1, vn′) > θn′+1
(
wi − αθn
′+1
2
)
+ βY (vn′+2, vn′+1),
(38)
with n∗ such that wiα ∈ [θn∗−1, θn∗) , then this optimization problem can be rewritten
as:
max
{
w2i
2α
+ βY (vn∗ , vn∗−1), θn∗(wi − αθn
∗
2
) + βY (vn∗+1, vn∗)
}
. (39)
Now the deviation of player i can be restricted to a choice in [θn∗−1, θn∗) (in fact wiα ) or
a choice in [θn∗ , θn∗+1) (in fact θn∗ ). The equilibrium condition is therefore equivalent
to the case where player i with wi = vn is indifferent to choosing vnα or θn. Therefore,
we need that, for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, vn satisfies the following vector fixed point
equation:
v2n
2α
+ θn
(
αθn
2
− vn
)
= Y (vn+1, vn)− Y (vn, vn−1), (40)
with vn ∈ [αθn−1, αθn) for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}.
Consider now an example where F is a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1].
The previous fixed-point equation can be rewritten as a system of equations:
(vn − αθn)2
2α
= β
vn+1 − vn−1
2
, (41)
i.e. αθn − vn =
√
αβ(vn+1 − vn−1) (because vn < αθn), with v0 = 0 and vN = 1.
For two thresholds, the implicit plots associated to the fixed point systems (41) are
depicted in Figure 8. We fix θ1 = 13 , θ2 =
2
3 , α = 1 and β = 0.1. We obtain v1 = 0.14
and v2 = 0.37. With these parameters WBm = 0.562. As a comparison, type-B
feedback with θ = 1/3 yields a lower WB = 0.55.
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5.3 Service provider optimization problem.
The service provider may wish to guarantee a given level of privacy, by designing a
feedback L that will satisfy the following constraint:
V (L) ≥ Vmin. (42)
If G∗L is the equilibrium action profile associated with L, then the service provider
should solve the following constrained optimization problem:
W := max
L(·)
∫ amax
0
b dG∗(b). (43)
subject to:
V (L) ≥ Vmin. (44)
A solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this paper. The problem is posed
only to direct the research community’s attention to such optimizations with the fol-
lowing additional note in relation to practice. While solutions to such problems may
be extremely useful from an understanding perspective, we should also keep in mind
that the thresholds should be restricted to “pivotal” values that the members of the so-
ciety can easily relate to. For instance, in the context of sponsorship levels for a event,
suppose that the optimal two-level feedback for maximizing donor contributions is to
set a threshold of 1023.11 dollars. It may however be more natural to set the threshold
at the pivotal 1000 dollars in a “digital society” or the pivotal 1024 dollars in a society
more comfortable with bits.
6 Related works.
This section is dedicated to the related works and especially the main difference be-
tween our work with (1) the information design paradigm framed in [9] and (2) the
model suggested in [6].
Information on information design: This work lies within the framework of in-
formation design. In [9], the authors suggested a unified framework for the information
design problem. They consider a finite set of agents with a finite set of actions. The
payoff of each agent depends on its own type and a state of the nature unknown to her.
The designer knows the state and also the type associated with each agent. He will de-
cide an information structure to satisfy his own objective. To provide a characterization
of the set of equilibria achieved by controlling the information, the authors define the
concept of obedience. Obedience is given by the set of "recommendations" provided
by the designer that agents will follow (in a Bayesian setting). This specific set of
strategies can be proved to be equal to the set of Bayesian correlated equilibria, which
is characterized by linear algebraic constraints. Once this set is known, a Bayesian cor-
related equilibrium is chosen to maximize the objective of the designer and an extended
information structure is suggested by the designer such that the desired Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is equal to a Bayesian correlated equilibrium. This can be proven to be
equivalent to a linear optimization problem. For a general overview of information de-
sign in the previously described set up, from the application point of view or from the
algorithmic point of view, see the survey papers [9, 13, 14]. This body of works has
significant differences with our approach. In [9], the authors assume that the designer
knows the state of nature and will design a probabilistic signal mechanism such that
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induces agents to behave according to the desire of the designer. A typical example is
how to create an incentive for companies to invest in a risky investment by hiding the
risky nature of the investment using information design. In our work, we design the
information that is supplied to the society. As such, our model is not captured within
the framework of information design suggested in [9]. We also use a deterministic sig-
nal mechanism (such as quantization) instead of a probabilistic mechanism. Finally the
framework suggested in [9] is not adapted to a continuum of types/agents/actions.
Social comparison and norm based approach: Our model builds on [6], in which
the authors define a game theoretical model where the agents have to decide the in-
tensity of their prosocial activity based on the following: their intrinsic motivation, a
reward associated to the prosocial activity, a cost for performing the prosocial action
and a desire to be perceived as an altruistic agent. In this setting, agents have private
information about their intrinsic motivations but otherwise do not have full information
concerning the intrinsic motivations of others. An information designer who, having
full information about the actions, provides limited information about all agents’ ac-
tions in order to aggregate prosocial action. Extension of this model has been studied
in [7, 2]. In [6], the authors examine crowding out effects when the service provider
is increasing the reward for performing a prosocial activity. In [7], a similar model is
studied, but agents have imperfect knowledge of the distribution of the intrinsic values.
They then study an information design problem where the question is whether or not
the designer should use "norms-based interventions" (in other words to reveal or not
to reveal more information concerning the distribution of the intrinsic value). In [2],
the authors try to understand the impact of making the action of an agent visible to
the community. By doing so the designer can increase the effect of the reputational
benefit. However, at the same time, the privacy of an agent is violated. Our work
captures different aspects of the problem which are complementary to [6, 7, 2]. An
important similarity between these works and ours is the fact that the reputation benefit
is modeled as a signal extraction problem. The major differences are the following: 1)
In [6, 7, 2], the authors consider that the prosocial action of an agent is revealed to a
proportion of the society. However when an action is revealed it is fully revealed as
opposed to our model. The information design is on controlling the proportion of the
society to whom information is revealed or on the amount of initial knowledge of the
agent concerning the parameter of the game. In our work, only a quantized version of
the feedback is revealed to the agents. 2) This new feedback requires a new mathe-
matical proof of the existence of the mean field equilibrium. 3) We address the privacy
dilemma from another perspective. Instead it is to provide partial privacy is not to limit
the fraction of the network that gets to know the action of an agent. Our method is to
provide a quantized version of an agent’s action and thereby respect privacy to some
degree.
Other related works: There is a wide range of applications of information design such
as routing game [12, 1], queueing game [22, 5], economic applications concerning per-
suasion [16, 8], and matching markets [19]. These works are not using the framework
of information design defined in [9] or the one defined in our paper. But still, informa-
tion (size of the queue, roads available) is hidden to improve the efficiency of a given
system (delay in a queue, congestion in a city), and in that respect is related to our
work.
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7 Discussion and extensions.
In this section, we will discuss the different extensions of our work.
Convex cost functions. Although all our results have been proved for a quadratic
cost function, extension to non-decreasing convex cost functions is direct. The non-
decreasing assumption is common in economics: more prosocial actions have higher
cost. The convexity preserves monotonicity in wi of the best response. The proofs for
existence will be similar to the quadratic case.
Equilibrium selection and learning algorithm. An interesting question would be to
understand if there is a natural decentralized learning algorithm that converges to the
equilibrium induced by the different feedback. For instance, we can imagine a mecha-
nism that mimics the behavior of an agent in the society. She will learn her reputation
(or rank) and will adapt her prosocial action over time depending on her current repu-
tation level.
Non-linear reputational benefit. In this paper we study linear reputation benefit in the
sense that E[wi | L(·)] is the expectation of a linear function of wi. Therefore, we did
not observe effects when an agent who is already perceived as prosocial relaxes on the
intensity of her prosocial action because it is costly to maintain a high reputation in the
society. It would be interesting to extend this work to the case where the reputational
benefit is equal to E[s(wi) | L(·)], where s(·) is a concave function of wi. Type-B
feedback will have similar results, but for type-A, a careful study of the ordinary dif-
ferential equation that appears in the proof of Theorem 2 will be needed.
Common resource sharing. In the current model, the interaction between the agents
is only captured through the reputational benefit. However, it could be that the lesser
the level of prosocial actions of agents in the society, the higher of the cost of an agent’s
action. Indeed, consider a routing game on a network with three roads and with one
of them being really cheap (Braess’s Paradox). The norm maybe that taking the costly
road is a prosocial action. The cost of an agent’s action also depends on the fraction
of the population that take the same road. In this new framework, we need to extend
the classical framework of routing game by adding the reputational benefit to the cost
function. There will be a need to adapt the classical results of routing games, and the
ones of this paper, to prove the existence of an equilibrium.
Creation of a collective identity. Our focus in this paper has been on how to use
social comparison and reputational benefit for inducing prosocial behavior at the in-
dividual level. From a larger perspective, however, it would be interesting to explore
ways to create and maintain a collective identity or a collective awareness. For exam-
ple, a group of people in a neighborhood could be induced to form a team and meet
team goals of reduced consumption via social comparison with other similar groups.
Another example could be to provide the collective with a reduced consumption goal.
Then one could indicate how much an individual’s prosocial action has contributed to-
wards the collective goal, such as how many kg of CO2 emission has been saved. The
challenge in such collectives is to ensure that interest is sustained over a sufficiently
long duration. Methods that can help sustain such interest could be a topic of future
research.
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Social network for immediate impact. Education can help improve the “starting
point”, for example, shift the distribution F of the propensity for prosocial action.
Policies to improve this starting point may however not be effective in the short term.
In contrast, our approach has been to make use of the social network to obtain a more
immediate impact. Networks are profoundly changing the way people aggregate pref-
erences, and our approach to make use of social comparison to induce prosocial be-
havior is in line with this. It may be interesting to see how to combine the long-term
policy-based approaches with the social comparison approaches.
8 Conclusions.
In this paper, our goal has been to show the importance of information design to im-
prove prosocial behavior. We considered two types of feedback, one without privacy
that revealed all actions to all agents in the network, and another that provided only
quantized information about agents’ actions. We extended the initial model of [6] to
more complex information designs which required us to derive new proofs of existence,
sufficient conditions for uniqueness, and characterization of the mean field equilibria.
When the intrinsic motivation is drawn from the uniform distribution we obtained an
explicit expression for the mean field equilibria. Moreover, we identified a setting
where it was beneficial to be economical with the feedback information to improve the
expected prosocial action. Finally, we suggested several possible extensions and future
directions which we feel will be of use to researchers in the field.
9 Appendix: Game reformulation à la Crawford and
Sobel [11].
The socio-economic setting behind the computation of the reputational benefit is the
following. (1) The society observes for each agent i ∈ [0, 1] a quantized feedback
L(ai) of her action. (2) Using this collection of observations, the society estimates,
for each agent i, the intrinsic motivation E[wi | {L(·)}]. (3) Agent i cares about her
reputation and derives a reputational benefit E[wi | {L(·)}].
From a strict mathematical perspective, we have been ambiguous in not specifying
the measure space over which the continuum of random variables {ai}i∈I are mea-
surable. The σ-algebras over which the conditional measures of wi given {L(ai)}i
are defined has been also left unclear. This is the intuitive language adopted in some
literature for ease of exposition without obscure mathematical formalism.
We now provide the necessary mathematical formalism. The game is composed
of only two players, the agent (leader/sender) and the society (follower/receiver). Let
w be the type of the agent distributed according to F (·). The realization w is known
only to the agent, but F (·) is common knowledge. Let a ∈ [0,+∞) be the action of
the agent. Let L(a) be revealed to the society. Let y ∈ [0,+∞) be the action of the
society. The players’ respective utilities are given by the following.
1. The agent’s utility:
U(a,w, y) = aw − C(a) + βy, (45)
2. The society’s utility:
V (w, y) = −(w − y)2. (46)
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Ideally, the society wants to choose y equal to w. However, the society does not know
w and only observes L(a).
The strategy of the agent, denoted a(w), can be relaxed to be a statistical experi-
ment σa : w → [0,+∞). We now suggest a framework, based on Crawford & Sobel
[11], in which the results of this paper can be interpreted in a mathematically rigorous
way.
The statistical experiment σa yields on an the associated statistical experiment σL :
w → [0,+∞)). After observing L(a), the society will update the prior belief F to the
a posterior belief, whose density is given by
P(w | L(a)) = σL(L(a) | w)f(w)∫ +∞
0
σL(L(a) | v)f(v) dv
. (47)
From (47), we can deduce that the society’s best reply to σa is given by:
y∗(σa) = arg max
y∈[0,+∞)
−
∫ +∞
0
P(w | L(a))(w − y)2 dw,
= E[w | L(a)],
the minimum mean squared error estimate under the joint law coming from F , σa for
(X,A) and the associated F, σL for (X,L). The best reply to y(σa) for the agent is
given by σ∗a which is any measure supported on the set:
arg maxa∈[0,+∞)aw − C(a) + βy∗(σa). (48)
The equilibrium we study in this paper is (σ∗a, y
∗(σ∗a)). In the setting of Crawford and
Sobel, the L was under the control of the leading player. Our setting differs in that L
is under the control of the information designer.
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